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The most likely way for the world to be destroyed, most experts agree, is by acci-
dent. That's where we come in; we're computerproJessionals. We cause accidents. 1 
~~ Tar fighting has come a long way from the days of swords and shields. 0/ 0/ ~o longer must armed forces rely completely on "arms," or even 
"forces," to gain victory on the battlefield. Today, computers are becoming 
the weapon of choice for the military warrior. Forget the old standbys of the 
M-16, Abrams tank, Nimitz-class carrier, or F-16. As forces become more 
computer and technologically dependent, militaries of the future will have a 
completely different look.2 In some respects, this should not surprise us. Tech-
nological change has always transformed the means and methods of warfare, 
but the pace of transformation has increased dramatically in the past few 
decades. While laptops and cyber chips may never completely displace guns 
and bullets in the warfighter's arsenal, they certainly will become an increas-
ingly critical part. 
Nowhere is this technological transformation more evident than in the areas 
of military space resources and information operations. Lasers, electronic pulses, 
pinpoint sensing equipment, and a vast array of other sophisticated space systems 
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are becoming an ordinary part of our day-to-day military experience. As the lat-
est microchip and computer network capabilities become an integral part of at-
tacking and defending those space systems, the future will be fraught with 
dramatic new possibilities. Yesterday's science fiction is becoming today's 
reality. 
Background 
This new reality is already a significant threat to the US national security infra-
structure. Consider the evidence. According to former Deputy Defense Secre-
tary John Hamre, one particular Department of Defense (DoD) computer 
network is penetrated as often as 10-15 times a day by computer hackers.3 With 
more than 2.1 million computers and 10,000 local area networks, DoD was the 
target of more than 250,000 detected intrusions in 1998.4 That figure is even more 
astounding when you consider that the Defense Information Systems Agency 
(DISA) estimates that only one intrusion out of every 150 is even detected.5 In 
February 1998, while the US was preparing to deploy forces to the Persian Gulf, 
a computer attack known as "Solar Sunrise" was initiated against computer sys-
tems throughout the Department of Defense. 6 The potential implications of the 
attack were sobering: 
Someone, or some group of people ... gained root access, systems administrator 
status, on over 20 important logistical computers throughout the Air Force and, 
subsequently, we leamed throughout the Navy and Army. They could have 
therefore crashed the systems. They downloaded thousands of passwords and they 
installed sniffers and trap doors. And for days, critical days, as we were trying to get 
forces to the Gulf, we didn't know who was doing it. We assumed therefore it was 
Iraq. We found out it was two 14-year-olds from San Francisco. Was that good 
news or bad? If two 14-year-olds could do that, think about what a determined 
foe could do.7 
"Eligible Receiver" was a cyber attack exercise in June 1997, which was 
launched by the Department of Defense against itself to see how well our sys-
tems detected and responded to the attack. For days, the attack went undetected. 
This exercise demonstrated the ability of a potential enemy to disrupt computer 
operations of major military commands, create large-scale blackouts, and inter-
rupt emergency phone service in Washington, DC.8 These types of cyberspace 
intrusions are not limited to the domain of criminals or terrorist hackers. States 
have been, and will continue to be, engaged in the use of information 
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operations. They recognize, as does the US, its value in protecting national secu-
rity interests.9 There have been reports that during the NATO-led Operation 
ALLIED FORCE campaign against Serbia, Serbs hacked into the NATO 
World Wide Web pages and flooded e-mail accounts in the US with pro-Serb 
messages.10 The reported Serbian actions, and others like them, demonstrate 
that the threat of cyber attack is real. Both the White House and DoD are cer-
tainly convinced. In response to the threat against DoD communications sys-
tems and other government computer data, the Clinton Administration issued a 
White Paper in May 1998 setting forth policy and goals on critical infrastructure 
protection.ll In addition, the DoD created the Joint Task Force - Computer 
Network Defense12 OTF-CND), which maintains a 24-hour operations center 
to provide warnings of cyber attacks on DoD systems.13 . 
Couple the dangers of cyber attacks with our heavy reliance on space systems 
and the threat becomes all the more sobering. It is more than just an axiom that 
outer space is the proverbial high ground.14 Access to, and control of, outer 
space are fundamental to our nation's economic and military security.1S More-
over, we can no longer take that access and control for granted. While the US 
dominates outer space activity today, it is estimated that within the next 10 to 20 
years more space-based systems will be available to friendly and unfriendly na-
tions alike.16 These systems will provide communications, weather, surveil-
lance, and a host of other critical services that will have both a military and 
civilian use. Friends and foes will be able to use the same space systems.17 
Therein lies one of the dangers. 
Modem military forces rely heavily on dual-use telecommunications media, 
including telephones, faxes, and e-mail that travel over civilian owned or oper-
ated networks. In fact, 95 percent of all DoD telecommunications traffic flows 
over public networks.18 Telecommunications are a particularly acute vulnera-
bility because of this high degree of dependence by modem militaries. 19 This re-
liance permeates every facet of society, thus allowing exploitation throughout 
the conflict spectrum at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.2o Because 
of their data transfer capacity and mobility, telecommunications are increasingly 
important as the critical media by which our national instruments of power are 
directed.21 
The threats are real, the vulnerabilities potentially grave, and new computer 
technology is largely responsible. Information operations and outer space opera-
tions are uniquely intemvined through their mutual reliance on, and vulnerabil-
ity to, computer technology. Moreover, that technology is changing rapidly. 
From a military operation or infrastructure protection perspective, it is difficult 
to keep pace with such rapid developments. Equally daunting is the effort to 
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apply existing legal regimes to these new technologies. Both information opera-
tions and space operations apply military force in a way that challenges tradi-
tional international legal norms. Admittedly, such a topic raises far more issues 
than can be adequately addressed here. Therefore, this chapter is intended only 
as a basic primer to introduce the reader to the international law applicable to in-
formation operations that affect military space systems. 
Scope and Definition of the Information Operations Concept 
It is readily apparent how wide-ranging the computer attack threat to our 
national security infrastructure can be. It can include activities such as of-
fensive and defensive electronic jamming, information denial, manipulation 
of data, morphing of video transmissions, destruction of hardware, or a 
myriad of other techniques to render military weapons and systems ineffec-
tive, inoperable, or unavailable at a critical time. In the legal context, infor-
mation operations-including threats by individuals, organizations, or nations; 
actions motivated by goals ranging from monetary greed to terrorist revenge; 
and operations with military objectives-touch both international and domes-
tic law. 
For our purposes, discussion of information operations is limited to actions 
by, or on behalf of, nation States. Moreover, domestic laws and regulations are 
not our focus, although there are certainly many regulations that apply.22 In-
stead, we examine those aspects of public international law relating to outer 
space that may have an impact on information operations. 
As a starting point, it is necessary to define terms, since "information opera-
tions" is not a term of art with a universally agreed upon meaning. Indeed, 
the US military services, and the DoD itself, do not use consistent terminol-
ogy. For example, in the glossary of Doctrine Document 2-5, the Air Force 
adopts the DoD definition of "information operations" found in DoD Direc-
tive 3600.1: "actions taken to affect adversary information and information 
systems while defending one's own information and information systems."23 
Yet the Air Force takes the unusual step of qualifying that definition with what 
it calls "a more useful working definition," namely, "[t]hose actions taken to 
gain, e}.'Ploit, defend or attack information and information systems and in-
clude both information-in-waifare and information waifare (emphasis added)."24 
Even though the Air Force and DoD definitions emphasize different aspects of 
information operations, their concepts, as well as that of the other military ser-
vices, include both offensive and defensive operations. While we use the term 
"information operations" in a very broad sense that includes attacking or 
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defending information and information systems, for the purpose of this chapter 
we place particular emphasis on computers as the primary means of doing so. 
The Importance of 10 to Military Operations 
The electron may well be the ultimate precision guided weapon,25 for infor-
mation is becoming a strategic resource that could prove as valuable and influen-
tial in the post-industrial era as capital and labor were in the industrial age.26 Use 
of the term "information operations" signifies a new way of thinking that recog-
nizes the central importance of modem information systems as force enhancers, 
as vitally important targets, as a means of defense, and as cyberweapons that may 
be used to attack certain targets.27 
While both netwar and cyberwar28 revolve around infonnation communications 
matters, at a deeper level they are forms of war about "knowledge"~bout who 
knows what, when, where, and why, and about how secure a society or a military is 
regarding its knowledge of itself and its adversaries. 
Netwar refers to infonnation-related conflict at a grand [strategic] level between 
nations or societies. It means trying to disrupt, damage or moclifY what a target 
population "knows" or thinks it knows about itself and the world around it. It may 
involve public diplomacy measures, propaganda and psychological campaigns, 
political and cultural subversion, deception of or interference with local media, 
and efforts to promote a dissident or opposition movement across computer 
networks.29 
Daniel Kuehl, Professor of Military Strategy at the National Defense Univer-
sity's School ofInformation Warfare and Strategy, notes that information war-
fare is intended to "influence the enemy's will and ability to fight so that they 
stop fighting and you win. "30 
Information is aimed at affecting the enemy's cognitive and technical abilities to 
use information while protecting our own-to control and exploit the 
information environment. In some ways it is technologically independent in that 
operations can be conducted in any of the media of war, not just cyberspace, to 
attain that key objective of weakening the enemy's will, but in other ways the 
new medium of cyberspace offers a particularly rich environment through which 
we can reach those elusive targets, the enemy's will and capability, via the various 
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entry ways and connecting points in the information environment, whether they 
be hardware, software, or wetware [the human mind].31 
The objective of offensive warfare has always been to deny, destroy, disrupt, 
or deceive the enemy-either in its employment of forces or in retaining the 
support ofits people.32 Mao Tse-Tung believed that "to win victory we must try 
our best to seal the eyes and ears of the enemy, making him blind and deaf, and to 
create confusion in the minds of the enemy commanders."33 Information opera-
tions are particularly well suited to sealing the eyes and ears of the enemy. By dis-
rupting or denying the flow of information between the enemy's military forces 
and its command and control elements, information operations can essentially 
render sighdess any enemy commander.34 
The Importance of Space Systems to Military Operations 
Space denial is an important tenet of our national defense strategy. 35 Inherent in 
that tenet is the recognition that control of outer space is essential for victory on 
to day's battlefield. Certainly, space power has evolved over the last ten years 
from merely being a useful force multiplier to being no less than an "indispensable 
adjunct."36 According to one author, "the contemporary reality is that the US 
armed forces could not prevail, even against a modesdy competent foe, without the 
support of space systems."37 Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael E. Ryan gives 
an excellent example of the practical use of space assets in a deployed environment. 
When a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft goes on a mission, the planes can send raw 
surveillance data via satellite to intelligence specialists in the United States, who 
can analyze it and send it to Operation Allied Force's Combined Air Operations 
Center at Vicenza, Italy. The data can then be sent to a pilot flying a strike mission. 
All this can be done within minutes and reduces the number of airmen who have 
to deploy.38 
During Operation ALLIED FORCE in the Balkans, a variety of space assets 
were used to support the NATO effort. According to Brigadier General Mike 
Drennan, Commander of the 21st Space Wing at Peterson Air Force Base, Colo-
rado, navigation, strike indicators, search and rescue, communications, and 
weather images represented just some of the space systems support provided to 
commanders in the theater.39 Additionally, both conventional air-launched 
cruise missiles and Tomahawk land-attack missiles launched from ships, as well 
as certain other precision guided weapons, owed their success to the Global 
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Positioning System (GPS).40 While GPS was designed by the Department of 
Defense as a dual-use system, its primary purpose has been to enhance the effec-
tiveness of US and coalition military forces. 
Our national space policy expressly recognizes that US national security is de-
pendent upon an ability to maintain access to, and use of, space.41 At times, our 
national security interests may require denial of space to our adversaries. Infor-
mation operations can playa key role in space control and denial. For instance, 
intrusions into an adversary's computer network and manipulation of key data 
can prevent a space launch, move an opponent's communications or remote 
sensing satellites out of orbit, or preclude satellite data from reaching command 
and control centers. 
World Wide Availability of Space Data Information 
One of the realities of space denial and space control objectives within our na-
tional space policies and military doctrine is that the US does not, and will not, 
have exclusive access to space. A growing number of nations and organizations 
are obtaining space assets and systems of their own.42 China has a rapidly devel-
oping space program, as does Japan, India, Brazil, and, of course, Russia.43 
France, India, and Israel have capabilities in high-resolution satellite surveillance 
technology, and this type of data is now commercially available for purchase by 
any nation.44 The US Landsat and the French SPOT [Systeme Pour l'Observation 
de la Terre] imaging systems have been around for years, but their technology 
continues to improve and become more widely available.45 For instance, the 
French are currendy marketing ten-meter resolution images, while some com-
mercial satellites are now capable of one-meter resolutions. 46 More recendy, the 
European Space Agency has developed Earth Resources Satellites (ERS) 1 and 
2, and marketed their synthetic aperture radar (SAR) images. Canadian Radarsat 
and the Helios reconnaissance satellite owned by France, Spain, and Italy may 
also have future commercial availability.47 A further example of the public com-
mercial availability of space system technology is the US' hugely successful GPS, 
which, until recendy, enjoyed a near monopoly in space-based navigation tech-
nology. Besides the availability ofGPS, Europe is planning to launch its own sat-
ellite navigation system called Galileo, projected to be operational in 2008. 
As non-US satellite navigation systems are developed and launched, 
additional legal issues and national security concerns arise. When a virtual US 
monopoly on particular space systems exists, such as there used to be with 
GPS, space denial or control is merely a matter of interrupting or encoding the 
information from our own systems so that other nations are unable to use i~. 48 
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However, when other nations have similar space systems, or can purchase the 
infonnation they produce, space denial or control may require more aggressive 
means of infonnation operations. The commercial availability of potentially 
sensitive data creates obvious risks to national security. According to one analyst, 
"Islamic Jihad could get its hands on a one-meter resolution picture of a US Air 
Force General's headquarters in Turkey, convert the shot to a precise 
three-dimensional image, combine it with data from a GPS device, and transmit 
it to Baghdad, where a primitive cruise missile, purchased secretly from China 
could await its targeting coordinates."49 
Infonnation operations, used to assure US space control by denying its use by 
others, will certainly raise eyebrows and stir heated debate in the international 
community. Since any decision to employ a military option, especially one af-
fecting outer space or space systems, must weigh political concerns and sensitivi-
ties, a consideration of world opinion on the subject is useful. 
International Opinion on the Weaponization of Space 
Since the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957, many nations in the world com-
munity have been ardently concerned about preventing the placement of weap-
ons in outer space, particularly with respect to new weapons technology. As a 
result, any potential use of offensive infonnation operations in, or affecting, 
outer space will likely aggravate international concerns. 
The debate has been polarizing, frequently pitting practical national secu-
rity objectives against the desire to maintain at least one environmental realm 
free from military conflict. Early UN General Assembly resolutions generally 
sought to provide that outer space would be used exclusively for "peaceful 
purposes," but the tenn was never defined. 50 While nearly all voices claimed 
to be in favor of peaceful purposes, they were not so hannonious on the degree 
of military activity that concept included. The reality, of course, is that outer 
space has been a domain of the military since 1957 and has been of significant 
importance to the military to the present day. Today, some advocates of the 
non-weaponization of space seek to impede further military development of 
space with the ultimate hope of curtailing an arms race in outer space. While 
opponents of this view are not against "peaceful purposes" per se, they stress 
the need to be prepared for war as the best way to protect national interests. 51 
In general, the two views are irreconcilable, although there is room for agree-
ment on specific issues. 
The United Nations, which includes members on both sides of the debate, 
has taken an active role in international space law from the very inception of the 
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space age. It has done so primarily through the work of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
In 1959, the United Nations established COPUOS52 to enhance interna-
tional cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. Since its creation, it has 
been the primary forum for the development of international space law. In fact, 
COPUOS was the architect for each of the existing five space law treaties. Of 
those, four have been ratified by most space-faring nations; together, they com-
prise the core body of international space law.53 
From its inception, COPUOS has promoted the use and maintenance of 
outer space for peaceful purposes. Early work resulted in the adoption of Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 1721 on December 20, 1961, which stated that "the 
common interest of mankind is furthered by the peaceful uses of outer space."54 
General Assembly Resolutions 1884 and 1962, adopted two years later, contin-
ued that theme.55 Today, the Committee continues to encourage research and 
distribution of information on outer space matters, sponsor various programs and 
conferences, and study the legal issues arising out of space exploration and activity. 56 
As its name implies and its work confirms, COPUOS starts from the premise 
that outer space should be maintained for "peaceful uses." While this is a term 
that everyone has adopted, as noted earlier, there is strong disagreement about its 
meaning. Past practice has demonstrated that most COPUOS members believe 
military activity in outer space, as potentially contrary to the goals of interna-
tional peace and security, must be closely scrutinized. In fact, at its fifty-first ses-
sion, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 51/44, "Prevention of an 
arms race in outer space." Included in that resolution was the statement that the 
General Assembly recognizes "that prevention of an arms race in outer space 
would avert a grave danger for international peace and security."57 Other Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions contain similar language. 58 
The large number of early space treaties and General Assembly resolutions 
would ordinarily reflect a committee that works well together. However, that 
has not been the case with COPUOS. Its early success in obtaining the first four 
treaties was due largely to the fact that compromises on space issues were easier 
to obtain before the full potential of space exploration had been fully under-
stood.59 However, fundamental rifts soon developed within COPUOS, and 
have continued, between space and non-space powers.60 More recenciy, the 
United States has found itself on the minority side of several General Assembly 
resolutions intended to de-militarize outer space. 
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From the perspective of the UN Charter, these resolutions are merely 
non-binding recommendations. 61 However, some commentators have asserted 
that the "peaceful use" of outer space concept reflects customary international 
law,62 and, to the extent it is referenced, therefore believe the General Assembly 
resolutions contain legally binding principles.63 This argument is not particu-
larly helpful since it does not address the meaning of the peaceful use concept. A 
more practical concern about these resolutions is whether the underlying view-
point will ultimately lead to the development of another space law treaty which 
significantly limits military activity, including information operations, in or 
transiting outer space. 
Conference on Disarmament 
Closely related to COPUOS is the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Also a 
creation of the United Nations, it was established in 1979 as the single multilat-
eral disarmament negotiating forum of the UN. The CD has grown from its 
original membership of 40 nations to 66, including the United States.64 As ,vith 
COPUOS, disagreements between CD members exist. These differences were 
clearly evident in 1985 when an Ad Hoc Committee, formed to find a means to 
curtail the arms race in space, held 20 meetings over a three-month period ,vith-
out reaching agreement on any of their objectives.65 The primary catalyst in 
forming the Ad Hoc Committee was the US "Strategic Defense Initiative" pro-
gram.66 In debating a proposal for an arms control treaty for space, the United 
States argued that there was no need for such a treaty since existing treaties were 
sufficient. In contrast, the former socialist block nations indicated a ,villingness 
to conclude an agreement that would not only prohibit space attack weapons 
then under development, but would also require the destruction of existing 
weapons. While the Soviet Union accused the United States of "disrupting" and 
"hampering" the ratification of several important arms control agreements, 
China's tone was at least as emphatic. China made it clear that "the 'Star Wars' 
plan must not be carried out" and that "China is firmly opposed to an arms race 
in outer space ... and proposes to achieve first 'the de-weaponization of outer 
space' at the present stage."67 The nonaligned and neutral States consistently 
supported the idea that space weapons must be prevented in outer space at all 
costs.68 
A more recent example of this split of opinion is found in General Assembly 
Resolution A/52/37, passed in 1997. That resolution called on the CD to 
re-examine the idea of establishing another Ad Hoc Committee to address the 
issue of militarization of space. This issue had re-captured the interest of the CD 
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in light of recent developments in lasers and perceptions that the US was seeking 
to weaken the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.69 Despite the efforts and 
objections of the US, the resolution was supported by 128 nations, including 
China, Russia, Canada,Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The US, GreatBrit-
ain, and France were among the 39 abstentions.70 Even more recendy, another 
General Assembly resolution called for the CD to reestablish the prior Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Adopted on De-
cember 4, 1998, by an overwhelming vote of165 to 0, the US was one offour ab-
stentions.71 
China has been particularly active in the CD in its efforts to keep outer space 
weapon-free. In addition to co-sponsoring several UN General Assembly reso-
lutions, it has also sought to obtain a legally binding international agreement to 
ensure outer space remains free of all weapons. In fact, China published a White 
Paper in July 1998 to outline its views on the weaponization of outer space.72 
According to this paper, "China stands for the complete prohibition and thor-
ough destruction of weapons deployed in outer space. "73 Additionally, it seeks a 
"ban on the use of force or conduct of hostilities in, from, or to outer space." 
China also wants to preclude all countries from experimenting with any space 
weapons systems that would provide strategic advantages on the ground.74 
While its latest White Paper does not refer to information operations, the principles 
oudined therein seem to imply that China would oppose the use of information op-
erations that could be seen as a "use offorce," the "conduct of hostilities," or as "a 
weapon of any kind" in outer space. Despite this strong language, it is not surprising 
to read China's most recent statements, which express an intention not only to use 
information operations for military purposes, but to extend their use into space.75 
During its 1998 session, the CD included in its agenda the frequendy revisited 
topic of the "prevention of an arms race in outer space. "76 During that session, 
Canada proposed that the CD create an Ad Hoc Committee, referred to earlier, 
,vith the mandate to negotiate a convention for the non-weaponization of outer 
space.77 The Canadian proposal makes two important admissions. First, it rec-
ognizes that currendy there is no multilateral international agreement that pro-
hibits the deployment of weapons in outer space other than weapons of mass 
destruction. This recognition is consistent with the longstanding US position. 
Even more important, however, is the statement that "[w]e acknowledge that 
there is currendy no arms race in outer space. We accept the current military uses 
of outer space for surveillance, intelligence-gathering and communications."78 
Despite these two major concessions, it is nonetheless clear that much of the 
world disagrees with current US national and DoD space policy to the extent 
that it does not expressly denounce the weaponization of outer space. 
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US and DoD Space Policies 
The Clinton Administration announced the latest version of the National 
Space Policy on September 19, 1996.79 The National Security Space Guidelines 
include the principle that the US will conduct its space activities in a way that as-
sures hostile forces cannot deny our use of space and preserves our ability to con-
duct both military and intelligence space-related activities. This makes some in 
the international community uneasy.80 The National Space Policy also makes 
clear what has been obvious for quite some time-that access to and use of space 
"is central for preserving peace and protecting US national security."81 
In terms of information operations, nothing in our current policy prohibits or 
even limits use of such technology to support our space security guidelines. In 
fact, it obligates the DoD to "protect critical space-related technologies and mis-
sion aspects, "82 and maintain the capabilities to execute traditional mission areas 
of space support, force enhancement, space control, and force application.83 
The use of information operations to protect our communication systems and 
data links, while being able to interfere with the communications and data of ad-
versaries, is wholly consistent with National Space Policy guidelines. 
Assurance of space access by the US is also included in the Department of 
Defense's new space policy set forth in DoD Directive 3100.10.84 Announced 
onJuly 9, 1999, this policy not only echoes the guidance of the National Space 
Policy, it also specifically refers to the need to maintain "information superior-
ity."85 Moreover, the wide variety of information operations that could be used 
to defend against attacks upon our space systems and to assure space control is 
consistent with it. 
Recalling the position of many nations involved in COPUOS and the 
CD, many of the US national and Department of Defense space policy state-
ments may run counter to the concept of de-militarizing space.86 Perhaps 
most significantly, the first sentence of the DoD policy unequivocally an-
nounces that "space is a medium like the land, sea, and air within which mili-
tary activities shall be conducted."87 Many nations represented in COPUOS 
and the CD do not view outer space as analogous to "the land, sea or air," but 
rather more like Antarctica, where they have expended much effort to ex-
clude nearly all military activities. 
When the statements of scholars and politicians from other nations are 
compared generally to those in the US, a clear difference of opinion regarding 
the proper role of the military in space, including the use of information oper-
ations, emerges. While information operations mayor may not be consistent 
with international opinion, they are consistent with both the national and 
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DoD space policies. Having considered world opinion on the issue, we tum to 
the applicable international law as it relates to infonnation operations in or 
transiting space. 
Overview of Space Law Applicable to Information Operations 
There currently exist no "thou shalt nots" in space law which specifically re-
fer to the tenn or concept of "infonnation operations." In fact, there are very 
few specific military activities of any kind that are restricted or prohibited.88 For 
instance, one will not find among the current space law treaties any specific ref-
erence to space lasers, anti-satellite weapons, kinetic energy guns, or infonna-
tion operations. For the most part, when examining space law provisions, a legal 
practitioner needs to work with general principles that must be applied on a 
fact-specific basis. Therefore, we will focus on those laws having a general appli-
cation to the concept ofinfonnation operations and then apply them to specific 
scenarios. 
One means of using information operations to protect our national security 
interests in space is by controlling our adversaries' access to infonnation through 
techniques that will interrupt, interfere with, or deny critical satellite data. At 
times, this can be particularly sensitive since denying data to an adversary that 
does not own its own space system may require disrupting a third party's space 
system. This, in tum, may disrupt access to data for other users who may not be 
involved in the conflict with the us. Using infonnation operations for such a 
purpose requires careful consideration of the law as well as national policy and 
security interests. 
US Policy on GPS Data Interference 
One such national policy relates to the use of US GPS data. GPS data can be 
accessed in two ways. The first is through the nonnal operation mode of the 
standard positioning service (SPS). This method allows access by all users, but it 
also enables the US to downgrade the data provided to certain users through use 
of various degradation technologies and cryptography. The second means of ac-
cess is the GPS Precision Positioning Service (PPS), which is granted only to 
DoD users and enables them to receive a clear signal with properly encrypted 
GPS receivers. Thus, the US military could seek to intentionally impair the nav-
igational signals released by its global navigation system in the SPS mode to pro-
tect national security interests.89 Such interference would only temporarily 
prevent commercial users and others from obtaining the same quality of 
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infonnation the US needs for its military operations. It would also be preceded 
by a public notice warning other users of the intentionally impaired signals. 
Since this particular GPS belongs exclusively to the US, the United States can set 
appropriate limits on its use by third parties. 
However, on March 29, 1996, the Clinton Administration announced a new 
national policy that would eventually remove prior military restrictions on the 
management and use of the US-owned GPS. As part of that new policy, the US 
committed itself to "discontinue the use of GPS Selective Availability (SA) 
within a decade in a manner that allows adequate time and resources for our mil-
itary forces to prepare fully for operations without SA. "90 The policy also stated 
that GPS would be provided free of charge to the rest of the world for peaceful 
uses on a continuous basis. 
This current policy should not unduly limit DoD infonnation operations ac-
tivities designed to impair or interrupt US GPS signals when necessary. By its 
terms, the policy allows the US to continue selective availability measures until 
alternative measures allow military forces to operate without them, even if the 
data is used for peaceful civil, commercial, and scientific purposes. Secondly, the 
policy directs the DoD to develop measures to prevent the hostile use ofGPS,91 
including defensive infonnation operation measures. Finally, in the case of ac-
tual anned conflict, this internally imposed policy decision would not preclude 
military use of infonnation operations to affect an adversary's ability to use the 
GPS system, if deemed necessary for national security purposes. 
United Nations Treaties and Pronouncements 
1. Ollter Space Treaty 
Although it was not the first international agreement to refer specifically to outer 
space,92 the Outer Space Treaty which entered into force on October 10, 1967,93 
has become the cornerstone multilateral agreement dealing with the use of space. 
Frequendy described as the "Magna Carta" of outer space,94 its significance cannot 
be over emphasized. It provides the basic framework of international space law, in-
corporated many of the principles set forth earlier in the non-binding 1963 Declara-
tion of Principles, 95 has been the basis of subsequent space law treaties, and contains 
several provisions "that have general application to information operations. 
Article 1(1) obligates parties to use outer space "for the benefit and in the interest of 
all countries" and provides that it is "the province of all mankind." Some schol-
ars have asserted that this language means that States cannot encroach upon, or 
interfere with, the lawful activities of other States. 96 This language does not, how-
ever, impose any legal constraints on military operations properly authorized 
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under international law. For example, military action pursuant to a Chapter VII 
Security Council resolution is, of course, an authorized activity for the benefit 
and in the interest of all countries, given the UN's authority to use force to pro-
tect international peace and security. 
Article 1(2) e:l!..-pands on the use limitations of the first paragraph, stating that 
outer space shall be "free for exploration and use by all States without discrimi-
nation of any kind." This language affinns the principle of free access to space 
and prohibits interference with that access.97 The language of paragraph two also 
contains an important condition that the use of outer space be "in accordance 
,vith international law. " Thus, if the military action is otherwise lawful, the fact 
it is conducted in outer space or through infonnation operations does not violate 
this provision. 
Closely related to the freedom of access principle is the non-appropriation 
principle contained in Article II, which provides that outer space "is not subject 
to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty." While this language might 
suggest that infonnation operations used to interfere with satellite signals or data 
are an act of unlawful appropriation of another State's space system, that view 
goes too far. Interference with a sovereign object is not the same as asserting a 
sovereign interest over outer space should that object be located there. Only the 
latter would violate the non-appropriation principle of Article II. The Law of 
the Sea Convention has similar language regarding claims over the high seas,98 
but it clearly has allowed use of the high seas by military warships (sovereign ob-
jects) ,vithout recognizing that interference with them constituted a claim ofna-
tional appropriation over the high seas. Absent a claim of sovereignty over the 
high seas, interference with warships on the high seas has not been deemed 
equivalent to an unlawful appropriation. In both cases, what is prohibited is the 
assertion of territorial claims.99 
Another potential limitation on infonnation operations is contained in Arti-
cle IV. This article contains the key provisions relating to military activity in 
space. Paragraph 1 prohibits nations from orbiting, installing on celestial bodies, 
or stationing in outer space any nuclear weapons or "any other weapons of mass 
destruction." The meaning of the tenn "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD) 
has "typically been defined as weapons that are intended to have indiscriminate 
effect upon large populations and large geographical areas. "100 It is generally ac-
cepted to include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. lOl Even though 
WMD could also include other weapons, notwithstanding the Russian position 
statement to the contrary,102 the use of an infonnation weapon is not likely to be 
viewed by the US as a weapon of mass destruction.l03 Ordinarily, its effects can 
be controlled so as not to destroy large numbers of people. For example, the 
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selective disabling by infonnation operations of a particular computer system 
does not come within the meaning ofWMD in Article IV. 
For the most part, Article IV, paragraph 2, deals with the moon and other ce-
lestial bodies. Among other restrictions, it states that, "[t]he moon and other ce-
lestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusivel}'for peactifill 
purposes." It also states that" [t]he use of military personnel for scientific research 
orfor an}' other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited." Despite the fact that the 
"peaceful purposes" language does not expressly refer to the domain of outer 
space, historically the US and other nations have generally agreed that activities 
in outer space should also be confined to peaceful purposes.10ol Nonetheless, it 
has been the US view that the peaceful purpose language does not preclude law-
ful military activity. lOS While this conclusion seems clear, determining which 
military activities in outer space are considered "peaceful"106 has been a topic of 
contentious debate. Indeed, from the moment the Outer Space Treaty was 
drafted, the international community has been divided on this issue.107 
Advocates for the position that the "peaceful purposes" language excludes all 
military activity other than scientific research often cite to similar language in the 
Antarctic Treaty of 1959108 and the conforming practice of nations in 
Antarctica. However, such a comparison is both misleading and inappropriate. 
Article 1, paragraph 1 of that treaty states that" Antarctica shall be used for peace-
ful purposes only." While this portion of the treaty is similar to the "exclusively 
for peaceful purposes" language of the Outer Space Treaty, the analysis is inapt. 
What many of these advocates fail to mention is additional language that is not 
found in the Outer Space Treaty. Immediately following the reference to 
"peaceful purposes," the teA1: of the Antarctic Treaty states that "[t]here shall be 
prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature .... " It is the additional 
language contained in the Antarctic Treaty, and not found in the Outer Space 
Treaty, that distinguishes the interpretation of the "peaceful purposes" 
language. Furthennore, State practice in Antarctica in 1959, when the treaty was 
drafted, was exclusively non-military while State practice in space in 1967, when 
the Outer Space Treaty was signed, was overwhelmingly military in nature. 
The US view that Article IV does not preclude lawful military activity is also 
supported by the historical context in which the Outer Space Treaty came into 
existence. When the Outer Space Treaty was signed, its two primary drafters, 
the US and the Soviet Union, were already using outer space for military pur-
poses. It is unlikely that the Outer Space Treaty was intended to proscribe exist-
ing practice by its two primary drafters. 109 The idea that "peaceful purposes" 
meant at least some military use was also consistent with the US space policy at 
the time. For instance, President Eisenhower declared to Congress, when the 
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National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) was established, that 
the US was committed to the principle that" outer space be devoted to peaceful 
and scientific purposes."110 Similarly, the Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 
contained language that "it is the policy of the United States that activities in 
space shall be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind."111 
Despite use of such language, that same act provided for military departments to 
conduct space activities, including the development of weapons systems, mili-
tary operations, and the defense of the US. Thus, the US has never interpreted 
"peaceful purposes" to mean only non-military activity. Rather, the US posi-
tion has consistently been that the concept of "peaceful purposes" only prohibits 
aggressive military activity contrary to international law. 112 In 1962, Senator Al-
bert Gore, Sr. stressed this distinction before the UN General Assembly. He 
urged that the "test of any space activities must not be whether it is military or 
non-military, but whether or not it is consistent with the UN Charter and other 
obligations oflaw."113 While this view is not held by all,114 it now appears to 
represent the international consensus 115 and is consistent with Article III of the 
treaty, discussed later. Therefore, any information operations undertaken in 
self-defense pursuant to a Security Council resolution, or in accordance with 
any recognized lawful purpose, would not be prohibited by either Article IV or 
other portions of the Outer Space Treaty. Moreover, during any period of inter-
national armed conflict, it is unlikely that these provisions would even apply be-
tween the belligerents who were parties to the treaty. While there are several 
views as to the test for when a treaty is abrogated or suspended by war between 
belligerent parties, the fundamental principle is the compatibility between the 
particular treaty provisions at issue and a state of war or armed conflict. Since the 
issue depends on the "intrinsic character" of the treaty provisions in question,116 
to the extent the Outer Space Treaty provisions being discussed here are incom-
patible ,vith the object and purpose of armed conflict, they would most likely be 
suspended. 
Finally, Article IX has the most direct application to the issue of information 
operations that interfere with the use of outer space by other nations. Indeed, the 
language of this article echoes principles enunciated earlier in the 1963 Declara-
tion. In addition to requiring all States to conduct their activities in outer space 
"with due regard" for the interests of other States, it goes on to declare the 
following: 
If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment 
planned by it or its nationals in outer space, . . . would cause potentially harniful 
i/lter[ere/lcnvith activities of other States Parties in the peaceful e:l'..-ploration and use 
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of outer space, ... it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before 
proceeding with such activity .... (emphasis added) 
Through this provision, the Outer Space Treaty made legally binding the 1963 
Declaration's principle of prior consultation based on the potential for hannful 
interference in the space activities of another State. 
Although the provisions cited above are likely to be interpreted in the interna-
tional community to mean that "hannful interference" is prohibited, there are 
two important limitations to this prohibition as applied to information operations. 
The first is that the interference must be directed toward the "peaceful" use of 
space by other States. It is clear that a State may lawfully interfere with the space 
activities of other States when such activities are pursuant to a lawful use of mili-
tary force. The second limitation is that the interference to the space system of 
another must be "hannful." Information operations that intrude upon, tap into, 
or monitor other space systems communications or other data for a military pur-
pose can arguably be conducted without "harming" the space system of the 
other State, and to the extent they do no harm, they do not violate Article IX of 
the Outer Space Treaty.117 Of course, regardless of such an argument, the State 
whose system was intruded upon would probably beg to differ. In fact, even if 
the intrusion were deemed not to violate Article IX, the political fallout could 
be extremely problematic. 
Article III is perhaps the most important and illuminating of all the Outer 
Space Treaty provisions, the one which puts all the others into proper con-
text. Article III states that the Parties "shall carry on activities in the eA-plora-
tion and use of outer space ... in accordance with international law, including the 
Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace 
and security . . . ." (emphasis added) It is this standard, far more than the 
oft-cited concept of peaceful purposes, that is central to whether or not activi-
ties in outer space comply with the Outer Space Treaty. While academic dis-
cussions will invariably center around the peaceful purposes language, military 
commanders, planners, and operators who are considering activities in outer 
space should focus instead on whether the military activity is la"rfuJ. under the 
traditional law of armed conflict. If a nation's military activities are conducted 
"in accordance with international law" and the Charter of the UN, then the 
Outer Space Treaty recognizes that such activities can be in the interest of in-
ternational peace and security. Consequently, it is Article III, not Article IV, 
that should be the primary focus of attention. Since the UN Charter is one of 
the standards cited in Article III, it is appropriate that we tum to that 
instrument. 
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2. UN Charter 
Article 1 of the UN Charter expressly states that the purpose of the UN is to 
"maintain international peace and security." Accordingly, military activities 
aimed at restoring peace and conducted pursuant to a UN mandate or otherwise 
consistent with the Charter would be for a peaceful purpose. Article 39 of the 
Charter authorizes the Security Council to determine if a threat to peace, a 
breach of peace, or an act of aggression exists such that measures to restore inter-
national peace and security are required. Included among the lawful measures 
that the Security Council is authorized to direct in restoring peace and security 
are those set forth in Article 41, which include "the complete or partial interrup-
tion of. .. rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means ofcommunication" 
(emphasis added). Clearly, information operations which have the effect ofin-
terrupting communications, and which are conducted pursuant _to Article 41, 
would not only be lawful but an act undertaken to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security. Therefore, such information operations would also be 
consistent \vith the Outer Space Treaty. 
The UN Charter goes even further in allowing for military action to maintain 
or restore international peace and security. Article 42 authorizes "such ac-
tion . . . as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and secu-
rity" when Article 41 measures would be, or have proven to be, inadequate. By it, 
the Security Council has the authority to direct its members to "use all necessary 
means" to carry out Chapter VII peace enforcement measures, and, indeed, past 
resolutions such as Security Council Resolution 678 (DESERT STORM) in 
1990118 and Security Council Resolution 1264 (East Timor) in 1999119 have con-
tained this language. Coupled with the "all necessary means" language of a Secu-
rity Council resolution, Article 42 allows information operations of far greater 
scope than merely interrupting communications, as authorized by Article 41. In 
determining the lawfulness of a particular information operation, it is necessary to 
evaluate the factual context, not just the type of information operation conducted. 
Information operations can also be undertaken for purposes of individual or 
collective self-defense, an inherent right of all nations clearly recognized by Arti-
cle 51 of the Charter. The mere fact that information operations affect space sys-
tems, or are conducted from outer space, does not make those op~rations illegal. 
International Consortia and Other International Agreements 
1. Intemational Telecommtmications Convention (ITC) 
The ITC is the basic charter for the International Telecommunications Un-
ion (ITU), one of the oldest existing international organizations. 120 The ITU 
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direcdy oversees the communications satellite industry, arguably the most im-
portant sector of outer space activity.121 A specialized agency of the United Na-
tions since 1945,122 it has been used by the UN to promote international 
cooperation in space123 through the regulation of telecommunication services 
and allocation of radio frequencies. 
Article 45(1) of the most recent ITU Convention, which was adopted in 
Geneva in 1992 and amended by the Plenipotentiary Conference at Kyoto in 
1994, requires that all telecommunication stations operate so as not to cause 
"harmful interference" to the radio service or communications of other Mem-
bers.124 The convention defines "hannful interference" as "[i]nterference 
which endangers the functioning of a radionavigation service or of other 
safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a 
radio-communication service operating in accordance with the Radio Regula-
tions. "125 According to at least one scholar, the term is intended to be broadly 
interpreted and covers "any kind of damaging or destructive activity. "126 While 
this interpretation may have some academic value, it is not widely held, is not 
consistent with the express language of the lTC, and certainly does not represent 
the position of the United States.127 
Information operations, such as implanting a trap door into the communi-
cations network of a potential adversary or setting up another type of then be-
nign, but potentially destructive, cyber agent in the telecommunications 
system of another State, might be seen by some as "harmful interference." Ar-
guably, because the purpose of its presence is to enable harmful interference or 
provide destructive capability when needed, the fact that an information oper-
ation mechanism is currendy benign does not mean it is non-harmful. It would 
be difficult to show that this type of interference endangered the functioning 
of a service, seriously degraded it, or served to repeatedly interrupt it. How-
ever, even if there were found to be "harmful interference" from the activity, 
if the implanting oflatent viruses or other cyber instruments were taken against 
a military network of another State, there would be no ITC violation. The 
ITC restrictions provide a recognized exception for "military radio installa-
tions" through Article 48(1). A more difficult situation arises when the activity 
affects a dual-use civilian telecommunication system, one used for both civilian 
and military purposes. 
Finally, the ITC does not provide for its continued application between Party 
belligerents during armed conflict. Since its provisions are not compatible ,vith 
the object and purpose of such hostilities, they will likely b~ considered sus-
pended between the belligerents throughout the duration of any international 
armed conflict.128 Thus, the only time the provisions in the ITC would apply 
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and possibly restrict some types ofinformation operations would be when they 
do not rise to such a conflict level. 
2. INTELSAT Agreement of1973 
Through the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium 
(INTELSAT), the US initiated the first worldwide commercial telecommuni-
cations satellite system.129 Created to encourage global nation-to-nation public 
satellite service,130 INTELSAT reflects the US view of space law and policy. For 
example, \vithin its basic structure, the consortium allows nations to invest and 
own shares in the organization, instead of it being organized along the old one-
nation, one-vote concept. This voting and profit sharing formula reflects the US 
positions that space is to be used for the "benefit of mankind," and that the 
"province of mankind" does not require an equal apportioning of space 
wealth.131 Despite these "American" views of space law, the Soviet Union 
joined INTELSAT in 1991;132 there are currendy 143 member countries. 
INTELSAT operates the world's most extensive global communications satel-
lite system in existence, and DoD has been a user of the system from its ad-
vent.133 
Articles III (d) and (e) of the INTELSAT Agreement describe military use of 
INTELSAT services. These provisions set forth a clear proscription on using 
"specialized telecommunications services" for military purposes. However, that 
proscription does not preclude INTELSAT from providing standard "public 
telecommunications services" to a military force for a military purpose.134 In 
fact, according to a COMSAT legal opinion, aside from the limitation on using 
"specialized" services, "there is nothing in the INTELSAT Agreement that pro-
hibits or discourages the use ofINTELSAT for either US national security or in-
telligence purposes."135 
The more difficult issue is the interruption, denial, or even destruction, of the 
data or data links from an INTELSAT system. There is nothing in the 
INTELSA T Agreement136 that specifically prohibits interference with commu-
nication systems, although it certainly is implied throughout the agreement.137 
For example, Article XIV(d) of the agreement requires a party or signatory to 
consult with the Assembly of Parties and furnish all relevant information prior to 
using an INTELSAT space segment in a way that might prejudice the establish-
ment of direct telecommunication links of other members. 
INTELSA T's requirements of prior consultation and disclosure in advance of 
an operation would be completely unfeasible in the context of a military in-
formation operation. Absent some agreement with the members to the con-
trary, a Security Council resolution authorizing "all necessary means" under a 
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Chapter VII action, or some other lawful justification, this INTELSAT provi-
sion could serve to require disclosure and thus limit peacetime military informa-
tion operations activities that interrupt, deny, or destroy another's data from an 
INTELSAT service. However, as with the other international agreements, dur-
ing a period of international armed conflict, these limiting INTELSAT require-
ments will likely be viewed as suspended between the parties to the conflict, thus 
allowing jamming, destruction of ground stations belonging to an adversary, or 
other information operations.138 
3. INMARSAT Convention 
The International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) was 
formed in 1976139 to extend the INTELSAT framework to include maritime 
communications and certain maritime nations excluded from INTELSAT.140 
While its purpose was to provide space connections necessary to improve mari-
time and aeronautical communications, it has expanded into other systems, such 
as mobile communications.141 
Article 3(3) of the INMARSAT Convention 142 provides that "the Organiza-
tion shall act exclusively for peaceful purposes." Initially, INMARSA T took the 
view that military uses per se were not compatible with peaceful purposes unless 
they were for distress and safety or purposes recognized by international human-
itarian law.143 Much like the Outer Space Treaty, the INMARSAT Conven-
tion, in Article 12(1)(b), obligates the INMARSAT Assembly of Parties to 
ensure its activities are consistent with the UN Charter. INMARSA T's "peace-
ful purposes" language must therefore be read in the context of the UN Charter. 
When that is done, it becomes clear the INMARSAT Convention does not 
prohibit military action conducted under the auspices of the UN Security 
Council, legitimate individual or collective self-defense, or military action that is 
otherwise consistent with international law. 
A recent privatization development, however, may have rendered the entire 
discussion over the meaning of "peaceful purposes" in the convention moot. 
On April 15, 1999, the assets and liabilities of the INMARSAT intergovern-
mental organization were transferred to a private company called, for lack of a 
better term, "new INMARSAT. "144 The new company's legal obligations arise 
out of its Memorandum of Association (MOA) and the Public Services Agree-
ment (PSA) between it and the residual INMARSAT organization. The MOA 
requires new INMARSAT to "have due regard" for certain principles, includ-
ing the "peaceful purposes" principle, but COMSAT's lawyers have taken the 
position that this language only requires the company to take those principles 
into consideration.145 
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Similarly, while clause 2.3 of the PSA provides that "[t]he Company shall act 
exclusively for peaceful purposes," the INMARSAT Assembly believed this 
language was political in nature and without an enforcement mechanism for al-
leged violations.146 Therefore, according to the April 15, 1999, COMSAT 
General Counsel Opinion, "COMSAT envisions no circumstances in which 
the 'peaceful purposes' principle would be invoked as a reason to deny service to 
the US Department of Defense or units thereo£"147 That opinion, however, 
does not address whether "harmful interference" with a member's 
INMARSAT space segment or communication link would constitute a viola-
tion ofits "peaceful purposes" language. Since the new organization is still based 
on the INMARSAT Agreement, it is not clear to what extent a member might 
seek to claim a violation of the provisions of that agreement. On the other hand, 
since new INMARSA T is now privatized, perhaps the only remedy to the pri-
vate company shareholders would be contractual in nature. Regardless, poten-
tial disputes with offended nation shareholders will likely be avoided if the 
proposed military action is taken pursuant to the UN Charter or other interna-
tionallaw. 
4. Arms Reduction Treaties 
Arms reduction treaties also contain provisions affecting the use of inform a-
tion operations. For instance, the ABM Treaty, in Article XII (2) , was the first to 
preclude any activity which interfered with the "national technical means of 
verification" of treaty compliance by the other Party. Most other arms reduction 
treaties, such as SALT II and the START Treaty, have similar language.148 
While these formerly bilateral treaties are limited in the number of Parties in-
volved, and there are concerns about what constitutes an unlawful interference 
with the national technical means of verification, the interference issue is cer-
. tainly problematic. Although this matter merits further elaboration beyond the 
confines of this chapter, suffice it to say that information operations must be con-
ducted so as to avoid interfering with national verification means during times 
other than international armed conflict. 
5. Principles of the Law of Armed Conflict 
Readily apparent in this overview of space law applicable to information 
operations is that despite all the sophisticated technology involved and the 
potential application of additional treaties and consortia agreements, by and 
large, the legal principles are the same as those applicable to other places and 
means of warfare. Just because military operations are planned for a unique 
domain--space--using a unique method-information operations-does not 
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change the fundamental legal constraints with which militaries must abide. It is 
imperative, as with all military actions, that a particular information operation in 
space or affecting a space object be conducted pursuant to a lawful purpose and 
in a lawful way. It is this second aspect oflawfulness that raises the issue oflaw of 
armed conflict (LOAC) principles. Notwithstanding the claims of some infor-
mation operations supporters that this method of warfare transcends the scope of 
existing law, LOAC applies readily to information warfare techniques.149 
Any offensive use of electronic means during military operations would im-
plicate the traditional law of armed conflict principles. These include the coun-
terbalancing principles of military necessity and the avoidance of superfluous 
injury, as well as the corollary principles of distinction of combatants from non-
combatants, proportionality, and chivalry.150 
The principle of military necessity is used to distinguish between what is and 
what is not a proper subject of attack. 151 It recognizes that enemy forces, along 
with their equipment, are always a proper subject of attack absent some other 
overriding LOAC principle. Similarly, civilians and civilian property that make 
a direct contribution to the war effort may be attacked, as long as their damage or 
destruction would produce a significant military advantage152 or accomplish a 
legitimate military objective.153 The presence of a dual-use system, commonly 
found in the arena of space systems, makes targeting analysis more difficult, but it 
does not change the fundamental analysis. Dual-use systems complicate the de-
lineation of purely military targets from purely civilian non-targets. Therefore, 
targeteers must resist the temptation to attack a civilian computer system, such as 
a banking system, university, stock exchange, or similar target, merely because 
their attacks may have some vague effect on the enemy. 
In a long and protracted conflict, damage to the enemy's economy and research 
and development capabilities may well undermine its war effort, but in a short and 
limited conflict it may be hard to articulate any expected military advantage from 
attacking economic targets.154 
Accordingly, proposals to target civilian information systems must be exam-
ined closely to determine whether there is a military necessity for the attack. 
Other potential targets requiring close operational and legal analysis could in-
clude dual-use systems, such as navigation satellites or public communications 
systems, in which the data is provided through an international consortium such 
as INTELSAT, EUROSAT, or ARABSAT. Attacking data systems of intern a-
tional consortium organizations will likely affect many users of the data who are 
either not parties to the armed conflict or who are declared neutrals. Basically, 
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the target analysis will be the same when using infonnation operations directed 
against space systems as it is using other means against other targets; it willjust be 
more complex. 
A complementary principle to military necessity is the avoidance of superflu-
ous injury.1SS Intemationallaw "forbids the infliction of suffering, injury or de-
struction not actually necessary for the accomplishment oflegitimate military 
purposes. This principle of humanity results in a specific prohibition against un-
necessary suffering [and] a requirement of proportionality. "1S6 It is the principle 
of superfluous injury that has led nations to agree to ban certain weapons.1S7 In 
the context ofinfonnation operations, it is difficult to imagine any specific use 
that has the potential of causing superfluous injury, but new technologies and 
uses require commanders to consider this principle. 
Another important LOAC principle, distinction, demands that combatants 
be distinguished from noncombatants, and that military objectives be distin-
guished from protected property or places.1ss Only combatants and military ob-
jectives are to be attacked.1s9 Additionally, indiscriminate attacks and methods 
and means of combat are also prohibited. A further aspect of this principle is that, 
with very limited exceptions, only members of a nation's regular anned forces 
are entitled to use force against the enemy.160 To distinguish between combat-
ants and noncombatants, the rule developed that combatants must wear a dis-
tinctive unifonn. 161 In the case of an infonnation operation initiated from a 
distant computer terminal, there is no practical need for the operator to be in 
unifonn. However, this does not mean that the distinction between combatants 
and noncombatants during an infonnation operation should not be retained. 
If a computer network attack is launched from a location far from its target, it may 
be of no practical significance whether the "combatant" is wearing a uniform. 
Nevertheless, the law of war requires that lawful combatants be trained in the law 
of war, that they serve under effective discipline, and that they be under the 
command of officers responsible for their conduct. This consideration argues for 
retaining the requirement that combatant information operations during 
international armed conflicts be conducted only by members of the armed 
forces. 162 
The principle of proportionality requires that any civilian injury resulting 
from a legitimate use of military force not be disproportionate to the military ad-
vantages anticipated. 163 Intemationallaw recognizes that attacks on lawful mili-
tary targets can result in unavoidable collateral injury and damage to 
noncombatants and civilian property. 164 While the commander ordering the 
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attack is responsible for making this proportionality judgment, the defender has 
a responsibility to properly separate military targets from noncombatants and ci-
vilian property.165 Information systems may be legitimate military targets, but an 
estimate of collateral damage and the damage from attacking them must take 
into account whether, and to what extent, they provide essential services to 
noncombatants.166 This will require thorough intelligence information on an 
adversary's computer systems and networks to aid a decision that must be made 
on a case-by-case basis. 
The final principle, chivalry, prohibits treachery or perfidy during armed 
conflict.167 It demands a certain amount of fairness in offense and defense, as 
well as a certain mutual respect, honor, and trust between opposing forces. 168 
When stratagems of war are developed, belligerents must be cautious not to 
subvert humanitarian safeguards to effect purely military goals.169 For example, 
using a computer "morphing" technique to create an image of an enemy 
leader informing his military that an armistice or cease-fire agreement has been 
signed, when in fact no such agreement exists, would be an illegal perfidious 
act.170 
Due to the complexity of applying LOAC principles to information opera-
tions against space systems, specific targeting proposals should be reviewed and 
approved in accordance with the rules of engagement in place and the proce-
dures established by the National Command Authorities (NCA) or the Joint 
Force Commander, usually through a Joint Targeting Coordination Board.17l 
Overall, information operations must be conducted consistent "vith the Stand-
ing Rules of Engagement (SROE) and may be used in individual or unit 
self-defense (as defined in the SROE) or with NCA approval.172 
Application of General Law to Specific Scenarios 
Having set forth the general legal framework applicable to information opera-
tions conducted in outer space or upon space systems, we now want to apply that 
framework to a series of escalating factual scenarios. While we hope these scenarios 
are somewhat realistic, they are not intended to imply that the United States or any 
other nation engages in such operations or even has the capability to do so. 
Scenario 1: Implanting Sniffers and Trap Doors 
Nation A has a security organization that obtains information from the 
Internet and attempts to gain information from other nations' computers. Na-
tion A is especially concerned with the activities of Nation B, which has been 
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hostile in the past. Consequendy, Nation A's security organization has directed 
covert activities toward Nation B. Both nations are industrialized and have 
well-developed infrastructures. Additionally, both nations have a space program 
that includes surveillance and telecommunications satellites with ground-based 
downlinks which provide data to the computers. 
A security agent of Nation A reports to his supervisors that he has gained ac-
cess, through the Internet, to the computer system that serves one of Nation B's 
unclassified military communications networks. This network uses space assets 
to ensure connectivity. He proposes implanting a trap door and "sniffer" that 
will, once in-place, remain inert and harmless, but which can be used to monitor 
data coming into this network. 
Discussion 
Obviously, gathering unclassified information readily available to the pub-
lic is legal. However, implanting a trap door and "sniffer" which can be used to 
monitor space communication systems of another nation is more questionable. 
Most likely, such intrusions would violate the domestic laws of the offended 
State, but there is very litde authority that, during peacetime, it would violate 
internationallawP3 This type of information operation is likely to be viewed 
much as peacetime espionage is viewed, namely, of no significant concern unless 
serious practical consequences are shown.174 As such, except for having to 
weather the diplomatic costs of protest and political rhetoric by Nation B, as-
suming they are able to ascribe the intrusion to Nation A, international law nei-
ther provides a remedy nor imposes any sanctions. 
Specific space law provisions similarly provide no legal restraint on this intru-
sion. The Outer Space Treaty only applies to activities in outer space, the moon, 
and other celestial bodies and is, therefore, not applicable to an intrusion into a 
ground system. Assuming Nation B is an ITU member and the system intruded 
is a system regulated by the ITU, then some might suggest that the ITC applies. 
They would be in error. As noted above, Article 45(1) of the ITC prohibits 
"harmful interference"-that which "endangers the functioning" of a radio-
navigation service or "degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts" a radio com-
munication service. Trap doors and "sniffers" do not degrade, obstruct, or 
interrupt communications. Moreover, such a cyber intrusion arguably does not 
"endanger the functioning" of the communication service. 
Like\vise, such an act would not violate the UN Charter. Implanting a moni-
toring device that establishes a passageway for future intrusions is all that this in-
formation operation entails. Such implanting is akin to a covert intrusion into 
the command and control center of another country and placing a monitoring 
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device on the phones. This action would neither endanger international peace 
and security under Article 2(3) of the UN Charter, nor would it constitute a 
threat to the political independence of any State under Article 2(4). While this 
type of computer penetration might constitute a threat to the territorial integrity 
of a UN member State, it will likely be treated much like espionage, which State 
practice has clearly accepted, at least tacitly. As such, it can be accomplished \vith 
little risk of prosecution under international law or UN sanction. The fact this 
particular intelligence gathering activity is conducted using information opera-
tions that impacts data from a space system, rather than more traditional means of 
espionage, does not change the basic equation. 
In sum, this first scenario does not present any legal obstacles or limitations 
under either space law or intemationallaw. Nonetheless, it could be highly vol-
atile in the political arena and would present a delicate policy decision that must 
be made by the NCA. 
Scenario 2: Interruption of Command and Control Networks 
Tensions between A and B increase, but have not risen to the level of armed 
conflict. At this point, another security agent from Nation A gains access to one 
of B's unclassified military communications networks through the trap door 
previously implanted. He temporarily jams the network so that contact \vith B's 
orbiting satellites will be interrupted for a period of approximately 30 minutes. 
After about twenty minutes, Nation B's space technicians regain control of their 
satellite network and restore normal communications. There is no damage to 
the satellite or permanent disruption of its functions. 
DisCtlssion 
Since this has not occurred during an armed conflict, some might argue that in-
terfering with the satellite network ofN ation B would constitute a violation of Arti-
cle 45(1) of the ITC if the 20-minute interruption of communications is deemed to 
be "harmful interference." The ITC definition requires that the interference en-
danger the functioning of a radionavigation service or other safety service, or seri-
ously degrade, obstruct, or repeatedly interrupt a radio- communication service. 
Whether or not a 20-minute interruption of satellite communication constitutes a 
serious degradation or obstruction might depend on the precise nature of the com-
munications that were interrupted. For instance, if critical search and rescue sys-
tems were interrupted thereby resulting in the loss of life of Nation B citizens, then 
perhaps the interruption would be seen as harmful, even though the space system it-
self may not have been damaged or harmed. 
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Under the UN Charter, there is some legal basis for the proposition that tak-
ing control of another nation's communications system or space assets may in-
terfere in the internal affairs of that nation thus violating its rights under the UN 
Charter. This would be especially true if the interruption resulted in loss of life as 
noted above. It might also be true if the space system interrupted was particularly 
important to Nation B's defense, such as a missile early warning system. Any de-
termination that rights under the UN Charter were violated or not will depend, 
as it will under the lTC, on the precise nature of the system that is interrupted. In 
this scenario, Nation A's interruption of one of Nation B's unclassified commu-
nication systems was temporary and it did not detract from sensitive military sys-
tems. Absent at least resulting moderate damage or injury, an armed response in 
self-defense by Nation B would not appear to be justified. Most likely, the pri-
mary costs of this scenario would be political in nature. 
Scenario 3: Moving an Adversary's Satellite Out of Effective Orbit 
Nation A knows that Nation B has a military reconnaissance satellite with 
high resolution capability that can provide NationB with critical intelligence on 
the movements of Nation A's troops. Nation A is concerned about recent belli-
cose statements made by Nation B toward Nation A and wants to mobilize sev-
eral thousand troops along their shared border. In anticipation of the outbreak of 
armed conflict, Nation A covertly obtains internal access to B's classified military 
computer system and uses information operations to send false data instructions 
to the Nation B satellite. While this false data does not damage the satellite, it 
does cause the satellite to move into another orbit where its surveillance capabil-
ities are rendered completely ineffective. 
Discussion 
As in the prior two scenarios, there is no physical damage or destruction in-
volved ,vith the satellite or systems of Nation B and armed conflict has not yet 
arisen. Unlike Scenario 2 though, this interference with Nation B's military sat-
ellite will require Nation B to take steps to "recover" the satellite and restore its 
prior orbit before it can be effective. In effect, the satellite has been "kidnapped" 
at a militarily critical point, providing Nation A with a distinct military advan-
tage should armed conflict occur. 
Since this scenario involves a military satellite and not an INTELSAT system 
or asset, the INTELSA T Agreement does not apply. Therefore, there is no re-
quirement under Article XIV (d) of the INTELSAT Agreement of prior consul-
tation or to provide all relevant data regarding the interference. Furthermore, as 
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long as the satellite was not engaged in conducting Nation B's "national techni-
cal means of verification" of arms control obligations, the interference would 
not violate the ABM Treaty or similar arms control treaty verification provi-
sions,175 assuming A and B were Parties. 
The problem raised in this scenario derives again from the UN Charter. As-
suming Nation B's satellite is considered part of Nation B's "sovereignty" or 
"territorial integrity," Nation A's actions to involuntarily move it out of orbit 
could be viewed as a "threat ... against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state" in violation of Article 2(4). If so, the Security Council, 
under Article 39, would be authorized to decide what appropriate measures to 
take against Nation A to restore international peace and security. Given the na-
tional security importance of this reconnaissance satellite to early warning, the 
Security Council might determine that this act rises to the level of an "armed at-
tack" sufficient for Nation B to invoke its right of self-defense under Article 51 
of the UN Charter. In addition, Nation B might determine independendy that 
the action requires it to invoke its inherent right of self-defense ,vithout waiting 
for a UN determination. 
Scenario 4: Destruction of Adversary's Satellite 
As anticipated, armed conflict has now broken out between Nations A and B. 
Nation A's troops, previously amassed along Nation B's border and heavily armed, 
have crossed into Nation B. Numerous reports indicate Nation A's troops have 
been firing at Nation B's military forces as they approach the nearest town. An 
emergency session of the Security Council has been called to address the situation, 
but no UN response has yet been authorized. Moreover, since Nation A is a close 
ally of a permanent member of the Security Council, a veto of any UN action 
against it is anticipated. Nation B's targeteers propose to destroy a key hub in the 
space communications system ofNationA and render its connected computers use-
less. They plan to maneuver one of their own satellites within close range of one of 
Nation A's telecommunications satellite. This "killer" satellite has been equipped 
with a device that, when activated, will emit an electro-magnetic pulse which will 
disable all electronic devices within a ten-mile radius. Destruction of the targeted 
satellite, located in geosynchronous orbit over the area of armed conflict, will render 
Nation A's entire communication system inoperable. 
DisCtlssion 
This scenario presents a clear armed conflict situation that very likely renders 
the Outer Space Treaty, the lTC, and any arms control agreements 
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inapplicab1eP6 If there is any doubt as to whether these international agree-
ments were intended to be suspended or terminated during armed conflict, Na-
tion B could make a prior declaration that it considers each of them inapplicable 
during this period of armed conflict with Nation A. 
Nation B could choose, for policy reasons, to treat this as an "armed attack" 
and exercise its right of individual self-defense, or it could treat A's incursion as 
"an act of aggression" under Article 39 of the UN Charter and seek Chapter VII 
sanctions through the UN. Before NationB can exercise its right of self-defense 
through use of force, Article 33 of the UN Charter requires it to exhaust any 
available peaceful means of setdement, unless, of course, such efforts would be 
futile. 177 Seeking action through the Security Council would likely prove fruit-
less, since Nation A is a close ally of a permanent member with veto authority. 
Regardless, Nation B's armed response must be necessary, timely, and propor-
tionate to the wrong suffered.178 
Given the military value to Nation A of this satellite system, there would be 
a legitimate military necessity in attacking this space asset. Destruction of Nation 
A's satellite would put the military aggressors at a distinct disadvantage in obtain-
ing and disseminating intelligence and communication data without resulting in 
loss of life. Additionally, since the targeted space communications system is used 
for military communications, even though it also has a civilian use, there is a le-
gitimate military reason to attack it. The principle of proportionality requires 
Nation B's commanders to make their best estimate of the military advantage to 
be gained and weigh it against their best estimate of the effect on the civilian 
population. The extent of injury or damage to the civilian population from in-
terruption of a communication system through information operations is likely 
to be significandy less than from kinetic weapons. Additionally, this particular 
information operation, used as a weapon, is neither illegal per se under interna-
tional1aw, nor are its effects necessarily indiscriminate. Indiscriminate weapons 
are those whose effects cannot be controlled, such as chemical and biological 
weapons. The ,vide area in which this weapon's effects will be felt do not make it 
indiscriminate, especially since its effects will be short-term, and limited to dis-
abling electronic devices. 
Readily apparent from each of these scenarios is the importance of making a 
case-by-case assessment under international law, and more particularly, LOAC 
principles. As with any LOAC assessment, a proper determination of a specific 
information operation can only be obtained by applying the specific facts to the 
general legal framework. What makes the assessments of information operations 
directed at or from space systems more difficult is the lack of extensive State 
practice to rely on. 
295 
Infonnation Operations in the Space Law Arena 
Practical Considerations in the Application of Information 
Operations in Space 
In addition to the legal regime applicable to information operations in outer 
space, military planners should also factor the unique physical aspects of space 
and the political consequences of specific military decisions into their calcula-
tions. In this final section, we have attempted to set forth a few such consider-
ations. Keep in mind however, that they are not based on legal constraints, but 
rather on the physical properties of outer space and the political climate of the 
international community. Additionally, these considerations are not intended to 
preclude a commander's discretion as to the appropriate military action to be 
taken given the specific military situation faced. 
First, any attack upon a physical target in space should seek to disable the 
space object without resorting to its physical destruction. Absent the effects of 
gravity and friction, fragments from physical destruction of space objects pres-
ent a significant problem in outer space. Those fragments will naturally spread 
throughout the orbital path they came from in an unavoidable pattern that may 
not dissipate. Their velocity and mass will make them a threat to our own 
space vehicles and satellites. Confining the effects of that debris will be diffi-
cult, if not impossible. Certain information operations in space can provide an 
alternative to the military planner to outright physical destruction of an adver-
sary's space object by destroying the computer links and data (its life support). 
Thus, "killing" of the object may be possible without creating a dangerous 
spread of fragments to our own space systems. 
Second, if a space system needs to be destroyed, consideration should be given 
to destroying it by attacking its ground segment, and thereby severing access to its 
"life support." Attacks on ground segments of communications systems have re-
ceived long-standing public acceptance in the international community as an au-
thorized means of conducting armed conflict as long as the target is a legitimate 
military target. A direct attack on a space segment in space, even if done consistent 
with international law, may not enjoy the same public acceptance. Given the im-
portance of international opinion upon national leaders and their citizens, military 
action often attempts to avoid undue public outcry in making target selections. 
Therefore, if there is a choice, it may be better to take out an adversary's space ob-
ject by attacking and destroying its ground segment. 
Third, destruction through 'Jamming" of a communication signal is preferable 
to destruction of the adversary's space object and accomplishes the same result-the 
enemy's inability to use that system. Just as ground attacks have received public ac-
ceptance, so too has the technique of jamming. It is a common practice during 
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anned conflict and is clearly recognized as a legitimate means of attack. As such, and 
for reasons of avoiding undue public outcry, jamming should be considered as an al-
ternative to the outright physical destruction of the space object. Additionally,jam-
ming avoids the problem of unnecessary space debris. 
Fourth, a less intrusive electronic means of attack is often preferable to a ki-
netic kill. Electronic attack can be a better means of avoiding detection while 
"masking" the identity of the perpetrator. When subdety or plausible denial is 
desired for political reasons, or if there is a need to delay enemy detection of the 
attack, electronic means can be very effective. When an adversary's system goes 
down, they will not necessarily know it was the result of an intentional act by an 
enemy. This is especially so if the system is left operable, but has been manipu-
lated so that the system data is, or appears to be, false. Depending on the system 
attacked, this manipulation can cause military planes to crash, artillery to miss its 
target, or enemy leaders to make poor decisions. 
No doubt, many other practical approaches to the use of information opera-
tions in outer space or directed toward space objects have not been mentioned 
here. Those offered are but a limited start for planners and strategists when con-
sidering the unique aspects of these two technologically driven realms (informa-
tion operations and outer space) during armed conflict. 
Conclusion 
We began this chapter with the observation that when the technological trans-
formations inherent in outer space systems are combined with that of information 
operations, yesterday's science fiction can quickly become today's reality. The need 
for militaries to keep pace is obvious. These technological transformations will re-
quire innovative approaches to an ancient reality--armed conflict between belliger-
ent nations. Information operations and modem space systems have created new 
warfighting scenarios that can, in tum, create confusion among military command-
ers and planners as to what is lawful and what is not. It is imperative that operators 
and lawyers forge a partnership to meet this challenge. 
As for what is legal in the outer space environment, there are few surprises. 
Still relevant is traditional analysis under well-known principles of the law of 
armed conflict, customary international law, treaty obligations, and the UN 
Charter. Aside from the need to apply the existing analytical framework to new 
futuristic threats, there are few legal limitations impacting information opera-
tions in or through outer space. 
The real challenge comes in understanding the expansion of international po-
litical sensitivities to weapons in space and information operations directed at or 
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from outer space. During times of armed conflict, those sensitivities will not cre-
ate violations of international law, but they can impede our actions through the 
political and diplomatic process. We should not underestimate the degree to 
which politics and diplomacy place limits upon otherwise lawful military activ-
ity. Thus, with only a few exceptions, from a legal standpoint, information oper-
ations in space are virtually no different than those conducted on the ground, in 
the air, or at sea. The primary difference lies in the diplomatic and political re-
sponse of the international community. 
Moreover, the "CNN factor" has had a large role to play in the decisions of 
military commanders to employ ground, sea, and air assets in recent armed con-
flicts. We can e:ll..1Ject the influence of the "CNN factor" to growe:ll..1Jonentially 
if military commanders choose to employ information operations against objects 
in outer space, a much more sensitive arena. Indeed, because of this, command-
ers may find their authority to choose targets and the means of attacking those 
targets withheld by the NCA in this arena more than any other. 
All that aside, however, once the political decision has been made, commanders 
should apply the same principles ofintemationallaw they do in more conventional 
settings. They must avoid the dizzying distraction created by the vast array of new 
technological tools available to the military in the space arena; they must resist the 
temptation of expecting that these apparent futuristic tools require a whole new set 
oflaws; and they must be willing to apply old laws and principles to new military 
scenarios. If they can do that, then tomorrow's commanders can maintain the legal 
high ground of warfare, while controlling the military high ground of outer space. 
This is not a matter of science fiction; it is reality. 
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WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 22, 1999, at Al . 
44. Gerald Steinberg, Dllal Use Aspects of Commercial High-Resolution Imaging Satellites, 
MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES, Feb. 1998, at 3. 
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working on SPOT-SA and 5B which they hope to launch in 2000 and 2003. See Steinberg, supra 
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the world once every three days at a cost of as litde as 5100 per square mile. See Susan M. Jackson, 
Cultural Lag and the International Law of Remote Sensing, 23 BROOKLYN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 853,854 (1998). 
46. Jackson, supra note 45, at 857. 
47. Id. at 858. 
48. On March 29, 1996, President Clinton announced a new policy to terminate the practice of 
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Press Release, President Opens Door to Conunercial GPS Markets; Move Could Add 100,000 
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49. Lane, The Satellite Revolution, cited in Steinberg, supra note 44, at 16. 
50. G.A. Res. 1148, 12 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18), at 195, U.N. Doc. Al3805 (1957), para. 
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purposes"); G.A. Res. 1348, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18), at 99, U.N. Doc. Al4090 (1958) 
("outer space should be used for peaceful purposes only .... "). 
51. The words of a former Commander-in-Chief of US SPACE COM, General Howell M. 
Estes, are indicative of this view: 
I, as a military commander, have to say that somebody is going to threaten them (our space 
assets); and when they [do], we [should] have armed forces to protect them .... [I]fthere was 
ever a threat to our national security [in space], the best-and only- way to solve the problem 
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Cited in Jose Filho, Total Militarization of Space and Space Law: TIle Fllture of Article IV of the '67 
Outer Space Treaty, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF 
OUTER SPACE 358, 360 (1997). 
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September 18, 1958. Its first report, adopted as Resolution 1348 on December 13, 1958, stressed 
that outer space should be used only for peaceful purposes. The ne)"1: year, General Assembly 
Resolution 1472 made the Ad Hoc Committee a permanent UN committee. 
53. Those four treaties are: (1) The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 
the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
(known as the Outer Space Treaty of 1967), done Jan. 27,1967,18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 
6347; 610 U.N.T.S. 205, (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967); (2) Agreement on the Rescue of 
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space 
(known as the Rescue and Return Treaty of 1968), done Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 
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Convention of 1972), done Mar. 29,1972,24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762,961 U.N.T.S. 
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Launched into Outer Space (known as The Registration Convention of 1975), opened for 
signatllreJan. 14, 1975,28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480,1023 U.N.T.S. 15 (entered illtoforce 
Sept. 15, 1979). A fifth UN sponsored space treaty is The Treaty Governing the Activities of 
States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (known as The Moon Treaty of 1979). It has 
only been ratified by 9 nations and none of the major space powers. 
54. G.A. Res. 1721, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961). See also John E. Parkerson, Jr., Intemational 
Legal ImplicatiollS oJtlze Strategic Difense Initiative, 116 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 67,95 (1987). 
55. U.N. Doc. Al5515 (1963). 
56. The Committee has two standing Subcommittees of the Whole: the Scientific and 
Technical Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommittee. The Committee and two Subcommittees 
meet each year to discuss and study questions put to them by the General Assembly. They in tum 
make recommendations to the General Assembly and provide information from their meetings 
and studies in their annual reports. See the COPUOS web page at www.un.or.at/OOSA/ 
copuos.html. 
57. G.A. Res. 51/44 Gan. 7, 1997). 
58. SeeG.A. Res. 53/583 (Dec. 4,1998); G.A. Res. 52/56 (Feb. 12, 1998); G.A. Res. 51/123 
(Feb. 10, 1997); G.A. Res. 51/122 (Feb. 4,1997); and G.A. Res. 49/34 Gan. 30,1995). Also of 
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59. NATHAN C. GOLDMAN, AMERICAN SPACE LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC 
26 (2d ed. 1996). Goldman also notes that more nations became aware of the values of space and 
sought to join the committee to protect their interests. COPUOS tripled in size in 1982, from 18 
members to 53. According to Goldman, the "drastic increase in size alone would guarantee a 
harder time for obtaining consensus." 
60. Id. at 25. 
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substantive international law. See Andrei D. Terekhov, UN Gelleral Assembly ResollltiollS alld Ollter 
Space Law, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 
97 (1997). 
62. The follO\ving principles derived from the four major space treaties have also been generally 
accepted as reflecting customary international law: 
(1) That outer space is free for e)"-ploration and use by all nations; that it is not subject to 
national appropriation by any means; 
(2) That activities in outer space shall be conducted with due regard for the interests of other 
States; 
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(3) That States that launch space objects are liable for any damage they may do in space, in the 
air, or on the surface of the Earth. That there are two liability standards established for 
damage caused hy "space objects;" a filUlt-based standard that applies to damage done to 
items in space and an absolute liability standard that applies to damage done on the 
surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight; and 
(4) Outer space activities are subject to general principles ofinternationallaw, including the 
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See Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense, An Assessment of International Legal 
Issues in Information Operations (Nov. 1999) [hereinafter DoD/GC Paper]. The paper is 
appended to this volume as the Appendix. 
63. See Terekhov, supra note 61. 
64. See the Conference on Disarmament web page at www.unog.ch/frames/disarm/ 
discon£htm. 
65. P.K. MENON, THE UNITED NATIONS' EFFORTS TO OUTLAW THE ARMS RACE IN 
OUTER SPACE 65 (1988). 
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67. ld. at 66. 
68. ld. 
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71. See DoD/GC Paper, supra note 62. 
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73. ld. at 24. 
74. ld. 
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the state's determination ,vill be fully eA1'ressed in this mysterious theater space (emphasis 
added). 
Quoted in Bill Gertz, Chilla Plots Willliing Role ill Cyberspace, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Nov. 
17,1999, atA1, A8. 
76. Agenda item number 3, Report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, at 2 (Sept. 8, 1998). 
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Filho, slipra note 51, at 359; General Joseph W. Ashy, former Commander-in-Chief of 
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87. DoD Directive 3100.10, slipra note 84, at para. 4.1. 
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space (Article IV, paragraph 1, Outer Space Treaty); 
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IV, paragraph 2, Outer Space Treaty); 
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Outer Space Treaty); 
(5) conducting military maneuvers on the moon or other celestial bodies (Article IV, 
paragraph 2, Outer Space Treaty); 
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Treaty); 
(7) military or hostile use of environmental modification techniques that could produce a 
widespread adverse effect in either the earth's atmosphere or outer space (Articles I and 
II, Environmental Modification Convention). 
89. Carl Rochelle, Coming Soon: Global Navigation for Consllmers, March 29, 1996, 
www.cgi.cnn.com/US/9603/global_satellite/index.htrnl. 
90. White House Fact Sheet, U.S. Global Positioning System Policy, March 29, 1996, 
http://gauss.gge.unb.ca/policy /FaccSheet. 
91. ld. 
92. The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under 
Water ("The Test Ban Treaty"), signed in MoscolVAugust 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313,480 U.N.T.S. 
43, T.!.A.S. 5433 (entered into force October 10,1963). 
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Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies." This treaty was a byproduct of the Legal Subcommittee of 
COPUOS and was largely based on the Declaration of Legal Principles governing the Activities of 
States in the El .. :ploration and Use of Outer Space, which had been adopted in 1963 by General 
Assembly Resolution 1962. 
94. See Andem, supra note 80, at 339; see also MENON, supra note 65, at 43; PeterJankowitsch, 
Legal Aspects of Military Space Activities, SPACE LAW DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 143, 146 (1992). 
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Declaration was a UN effort to restrict a future arms race in space, even though the resolution had 
no binding legal effect. It set forth the principles of co-operation and mutual assistance, calling for 
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especially those in response to an aggressive, hostile act of another State that was clearly outside the 
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99. This does not mean to imply that an assertion of sovereignty can only be done by means of 
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telecommunications in the context of international security, U.N.G.A. 54/213 (Aug. 10, 1999). 
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views on whether the peaceful purposes language should have application at all to activities in outer 
space since the express reference to peaceful purposes is limited to "the moon and other celestial 
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preamble of the Outer Space Treaty. Advocates of a narrow interpretation note that when the 
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words "outer space." Thus, the abse1lce of the term "outer space" in the second part of Article IV, 
dealing with "peaceful purposes," is even more telling. See Morgan, supra note 19, at 300. 
105. During the drafting of the Outer Space Treaty, delegations ftom India, Iran, Austria, 
Japan, Brazil, and Mexico tried to include language that would completely demilitarize outer 
space, but their proposals were rejected by both the Soviet Union and the US. Kunich, supra note 
100, at 137; Parkerson, supra note 54, at 82. 
106. See Morgan, supra note 19, at 240-241. The US view has been that use of outer space for 
self-defense constitutes a "peaceful purpose." ld. at n. 366. In addition, use of communication, 
navigation, remote sensing, and reconnaissance satellites have also become an accepted practice 
considered to be for "peaceful purposes." ld. at 308, 317. 
107. See Douglas S. Anderson, A Military Look i1lto Space: T1!e Ultimate High Grolmd, ARMY 
LAWYER 19, 28 (1995); see also Morgan, supra note 19, at 299. 
108. An excellent example is that cited by Parkerson supra note 54, at n. 99, referring to 
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used for peaceful purposes only," fails to mention the additional clarifYing language not included in 
the Outer Space Treaty. Antarctic Treaty, d01leatWashington, December 1,1959,12 U.S.T. 794, 
402 U.N.T.S. 71, T.I.A.S. 4780 (e1ltered illtoforceonJune23, 1961). Similarly, the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea also provides that the high seas shall be reserved for "peaceful purposes," yet 
there has been no attempt to prohibit military ships from the high seas. The practice of nation States 
demonstrates that the non-aggressive use of the high seas is consistent \vith a peaceful purpose. Sec 
Parkerson, supra note 54, at 84. 
109. Parkerson, supra note 54. 
110. Statement by the President of the United States on International Cooperation in Space, 
reprinted in Senate Committee on Aeronautics and Space Sciences; see also Kunich, supra note 100, 
at 136-137. 
111. 42 US Code sec. 2451(a). 
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112. See Kunich, slIpra note 100, at 131; Anderson, slIpranote 107, at 27; Parkerson, slIpra note 
54, at 82; Bridge, slIpra note 101, at 658. 
113. See Bridge, slIpra note 101, at 658. 
114. A more extreme view is held by Professor Mark G. Markoff, Professor ofInternational 
Law, University ofFribourg, S\vitzerland, who believes that the Outer Space Treaty was intended 
to completely demilitarize space. According to Professor Markoff, all parties to the Outer Space 
Treaty have agreed, through Article I, not to engage in any space activity that is not in the common 
interest of all other nations. Since any military activity, even that for self-defense or other 
non-aggressive purposes, cannot be for the benefit of all nations, the Outer Space Treaty does not 
authorize any military activity in outer space. See Anderson, slIpra note 107, at 26; Parkerson, slIpra 
note 54, at 83. 
115. See Parkerson, slIpra note 54, at 82; Morgan, slIpra note 19, at 303. 
116. RymnJames Parsons, TIle Fight to Save the Planet: u.s. Anned Forces "Greenkeeping" and 
E,!forcement oJthe Lazv Pertaining to Enviroll/nwtal Protection Dllring Anned COIif/ict, 10 GEORGIA 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW 441, 470 (1998). Historically, treaty 
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OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 302 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952). 
Currendy, the compatibility of particular treaties during a state of armed conflict is assessed on a 
case-by-case basis. D. P. O'CONNELL, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 268 (2d ed. 1970); 
REsTATEMENT (THIRD), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, sec. 336, 
Reporter's Notes, 221-22 (1986). 
117. Many might argue that copying, diverting, modifying, or otherwise tampering with data 
of another does constitute "harm" and would be a violation of international law. 
118. S.C. Res. 678 (Nov. 291990). 
119. S.C. Res 1264 (Sept. 15 1999). 
120. GOLDMAN, slIpra note 59, at 28. The organization had its beginnings in 1865 when 
co-operative regulations were initiated by the Geneva Telegraphic Convention in Paris. That first 
agreement was modified and e>..1:ended, culminating in the ITU in 1932 as a result of the 
combining of similar conventions. See 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 225, n. 1 (Nandasiri 
Jasentuliyana and Roy S.K. Lee eds., 1979). 
121. GOLDMAN, slIpra note 59, at 28. 
122. 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, slIpra note 120, at 196. 
123. SPACE LAW DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 23 (NandasiriJasentuliyana ed., 1992). 
124. The US signed the Convention on December 22, 1992, and signed the 1994 amendments 
at Kyoto on October 14, 1994. For a discussion of the 1992 ITC and 1994 amendments, see Marian 
Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice oJthe United States Relating to International Lazv, 91 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (1997). 
125. Annex, para. 1003 of the 1992 ITC. This language is identical to that found in Annex 2, 
para. 2003 of the 1982 ITC. 
126. Eilene Galloway, International Institlltions to Ensllre Peaciflll Uses oj Ollter Space, IX ANNALS 
OF AIR & SPACE LAW 323 (1984). 
127. The US position, according to Michael W. Zehner, Air Force Deputy General Counsel 
(International AtTairs), follows the more restrictive language of the ITC provision. Interview with 
Mr. Zehner (Dec. 20,1999). 
128. SlIpra note 116. An interesting comparison can be made to virtually identical 
non-interference language contained in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS 
Convention). In Article 19(2)(k), the LOS Convention prohibits "any act aimed at interfering 
with any systems of communication" during innocent passage in a foreign territorial sea. No one 
has argued that similar non-interference provisions contained in the LOS Convention apply 
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non-discriminatory basis to all areas of the world." Thus, interference through information 
operations with multidirectional channels such as telex, telephony, and data transmission would 
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See, Martin A. Rothblatt, Satellite Communication and Spectnllll Allocation, 76 AMERICAN 
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139. SPACE LAW DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE, supra note 123, at 102; see also 1 MANUAL ON 
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open to all nations. SPACE LAW DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE, supra note 123, at 102. 
141. !d. at 102; see also GOLDMAN, supra note 59, at 58. 
142. Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization, opettedfor signaturc Sep. 
3,1976, 15 I.L.M.1051 (1976) (entered into force July 1976). 
143. Guidelines for INMARSAT Convention, Article 3(3) (March 29, 1988), (filed with 
INMARSAT following consultation with Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, France, India, ltaly,Japan, 
Netherlands, Oman, Singapore, UK, and USA), reprillted ill Memorandum of Law on The 
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